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Migration is generally triggered by armed conflicts and human rights violations, climate 
change, economic pressure and global opportunities, and the existence of kinship 
created by earlier migration. Many states have enacted restrictive laws on immigration 
and strengthened the enforcement of these laws, particularly to minimise their 
responsibilities under international law towards migrants and their families.  
Principles of international law regarding the family emerged relatively recently. 
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, issues concerning families and family 
law were dealt with by international law ‘only insofar as it established the choice-of-law 
principles for cases in national courts involving immigrant families or families of mixed 
nationality.’2 Back then, disputes relating to the personal status of individuals were 
                                                 
1
 Richard Back, Illusions: The adventures of a reluctant Messiah, New York: Delta Trade Paperbacks, 1998, 
at p.65. 
2
 Sonja Starr & Lea Brilmayer, ‘Family Separation as a Violation of International Law’, Berkeley Journal of 
International Law 21 (2003), pp.213-287, at p.216. 
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governed by the law of the individual’s domicile, under ‘the domicile-based principle’.3 
The rise in human rights treaties in the second half of the twentieth century led to the 
recognition of substantive principles relating to states’ treatment of families and the 
protection of children.4 It is now generally recognised that the family ‘is entitled to 
respect, protection, assistance, and support’.5 
This chapter examines the centrality of the family, both nuclear and extended, in 
the international legal framework in a migration context. It focuses particularly on family 
unity and family reunification of persons in need of protection, that is, on already 
established families of refugees and asylum seekers and the resulting legal issues arising 
from the refusal to enter or the proposed deportation of a family member. This chapter 
does not therefore discuss families in formation or immigration for the purpose of 
marriage.6 
It is divided into five sections. Section two examines the international legal 
framework that establishes the protection of the family as a human right. It argues that 
a subjective right to family clearly exists under international human rights law but that 
the status of a ‘right’ to family unity/reunification is less clear in international law for 
two main reasons: first, the lack of a universal definition of ‘family’ underlying the 
concept of family reunification, and two, the protection of family reunification requires 
positive steps on the part of states. Sections three and four explore the contributions of 
the European Court of Human Rights and the European Union, respectively, to the 
enjoyment of a right to family reunification, and discuss the relationship between the 
two courts in this context. In a concluding section five, this chapter draws on selective 
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 Ibid, p.216. 
4
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5
 Kate Jastram, ‘Family Unity: The New Geography of Family Life’, Migration Policy Institute, May 1, 2003. 
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comparisons with other regional legal systems and identifies areas of controversy that 
require further development in law and practice. 
 
2. The international legal framework and protection of the family as a human 
right 
 
2.1. International Human Rights Law 
Respect for the right to family or family life7 against arbitrary or unlawful interference is 
expressly provided in several instruments of international human rights law.8 The family 
is generally defined as ‘the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled 
to protection by society and the State’.9 In the context of the rights of the child, the UN 
Commission on Human rights has also consistently held that the ‘family is the basic unit 
of society and as such should be strengthened’.10 
                                                 
7
 The Convention on the Rights of the Child also refers to the ‘family environment’ (Preamble, Recitals 6 
and 7), whilst the UN Commission on Human Rights stresses ‘family rights and customs’ in its Resolutions 
condemning Israeli policies and practices in the occupied Arab territories, including Palestine. See, ICRC, 
Practice Relating to Rule 105, 2010, Section A. sub-section VII. 
8
 ECHR, article 8; 1969 American Convention on HR, article 11; CRC, article 16; African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, article 18; ICCPR, article 17(1); ICESCR, article 10(1); UDHR, article 12; the 1990 Cairo 
Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, article 5(b) (society and the state ‘shall ensure family protection 
and welfare’); EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, article 7; the 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement, Principle 17. 
9
 Article 16(3) UDHR; Article 23(1) ICCPR; ICESCR, article 10(1); CRC, Preamble Recital 6; AmCHR, article 
17(1); African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, article 18; Additional Protocol to the AmCHR of San 
Salvador (1988), article 15(1). 
10
 ICRC, Practice Relating to Rule 105, 2010, referring to the preamble in Resolutions 2003/86, 2004/48, 
2005/44. 
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These instruments protect both already existing families as well as future 
families through the right to marriage and to form a family.11 Yet, none of these 
provisions constitute a right to family reunification as such.12 Rather, in order to give 
effect to ‘the fundamental principle of preserving family unity’,13 international human 
rights law seeks to facilitate family reunification and family reunion, including the 
tracing of dispersed family members.14 The same applies under international 
humanitarian law and international refugee law.  
 
2.2. International Humanitarian Law 
Respect for family life (namely, ‘family honour’ and ‘family rights’) is generally protected 
under customary international humanitarian law and treaties of international 
humanitarian law.15 In addition, international humanitarian law requires states to 
facilitate the reunion of families dispersed as a result of armed conflicts.16 
                                                 
11
 Alice Edwards, ‘Human Rights, Refugees, and the Right ‘to Enjoy’ Asylum’, International Journal of 
Refugee Law 17 (2) 2005, pp.293-330, at p.312. See in particular, Article 16(1) UDHR, Article 23(3) ICCPR, 
and Article 19(1) ICESCR). 
12
 Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly’s Recommendation 1686 (2004) on human mobility and the 
right to family reunion, however, acknowledges the right to family reunion for lawfully resident migrants 
and refugees as a tool for strengthening the policy of integration into the host society and is in the 
interests of social cohesion (para.6). It recommends therefore the right to family reunion to be applicable 
as soon as possible to all lawfully residing immigrants and refugees. 
13
 Quoted from the Quadripartite Agreement on Voluntary Return of Refugees and IDPs in the Republic of 
Georgia, 1994. Kate Jastram and Kathleen Newland posit that ‘The right to family unity is inherent in the 
right to family life’, in Feller et al. Refugee Protection in International Law, CUP, 2003, at p.556. 
14
 CRC, article 10 and article 22(1) and 22(2); 2003 UN Convention on the Protection of Rights of all 
Migrant Workers and Members of their Family, article 44; European Social Charter (revised, 1996), article 
19(6)); 1998 Guiding principles on Internal Displacement, principle 17; numerous UNGA Resolutions 
adopted annually since 1996, and UNGA Resolutions on the Rights of the Child adopted annually since 
2004; UN Commission on Human Rights Resolutions calling, in particular, for states to protect refugees 
and internally displaced children and to give priority to family tracing and reunification. 
15
 The 1863 Lieber Code, or Instructions for the Government of Armies of the US in the Field, prepared by 
Francis Lieber, promulgated as General Order No.100 by President Abrahan Lincoln, Washington DC, 
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2.3. International Refugee Law 
In a migration context, particularly with regard to refugees and asylum seekers, the right 
to family or family life often clashes with states’ power to expel or deny entry to 
members of their family, since refugees are not able to return to their country of origin 
in order to enjoy family life there. States’ power to expel a member of an existing family 
to his/her country of origin raise issues of ‘family unity’; states’ power to deny entry to a 
family member in order to reunite with another family member(s) raises issues of family 
reunification or reunion. As indicated above, ‘family unity’ and ‘family reunification’ of 
refugees and asylum seekers, whether or not they are children, are protected under 
both international human rights law and international humanitarian law. However, 
Stevens insightfully observes that ‘Despite the importance ascribed to the family … once 
the family assumes the added descriptor of ‘migrant’ or ‘asylum-seeking’, there is an 
evident shift in approach by most states’.17  
The right to family life is absent from the text of the 1951 Refugee Convention. 
Notwithstanding, the Final Act of the UN Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the States 
of Refugees and Stateless Persons unanimously endorsed the principle of family unity as 
‘an essential right of the refugee’ and recommended governments 
to take the necessary measures for the protection of the refugee’s family 
especially with a view to: (1) Ensuring that the unity of the refugee’s family is 
                                                                                                                                                 
article 37 provides: ‘The United States acknowledge and protect, in hostile countries occupied by them, … 
the sacredness of domestic relations’. Both Hague Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War 
on Land (1899) and (1907) provide in their article 46: ‘Family honour and rights … must be respected’. The 
1949 Refugee Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, article 27(1) 
provides: ‘Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their … family rights’. See, for 
full details, ICRC, ‘Practice Relating to Rule 105’, 2010, available at http://www.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule105 
16
 1949 Geneva Convention IV, article 26; 1977 Additional Protocol I, article 74; 1977 Additional Protocol 
II, article 4(3)(b) 
17
 Dallal Stevens, ‘Asylum-Seeking Families in Current Legal Discourse: A UK Perspective’, University of 
Warwick, Legal Studies Research Paper 2009/10, at p.7. Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1523092 
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maintained particularly in cases where the head of the family has fulfilled the 
necessary conditions for admission to a particular country, (2) The protection of 
refugees who are minors, in particular unaccompanied children and girls, with 
special reference to guardianship and adoption.18  
In sum, the 1951 Refugee Convention does not recognize a right to family reunion for 
refugees, but the Final Act mentions positive steps (‘necessary measures’) that states 
should take to ensure the preservation of family unity. Jastram and Newland point out 
that ‘its [Recommendation B] adoption as one of only five recommendations indicates 
its importance’.19 
Over the years, UNHCR has extensively promoted family reunion or reunification 
through various soft-law instruments that have re-affirmed family unity as a 
fundamental principle. EXCOM Conclusions no.9 (XXVIII) on Family Reunion (1977) was 
the first to endorse explicitly the ‘fundamental importance of the principle of family 
reunion’ for refugees. EXCOM Conclusions no.24 (XXXII) on Family Reunification (1981) 
reiterates the principle of the unity of the family and provides that ‘every effort should 
be made to ensure the reunification of separated refugee families’.20 In particular, 
countries of origin ‘should facilitate family reunification by granting exit permission to 
family members of refugees to enable them to join the refugee abroad’, and countries 
of asylum should ‘apply liberal criteria in identifying those family members who can be 
admitted with a view to promoting a comprehensive reunification of the family’.21 
Documentary proofs of marriage or of filiation of the children should not be an absolute 
requirement.22 Family members should be granted the same rights as the head of the 
family who has been recognised as a refugee.23 And, in cases involving refugee children, 
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 Refugee Convention, Final Act, section IV Recommendation B. 
19
 Kate Jastram and Kathleen Newland, ‘Family Unity and Refugee Protection’, in E. Feller, V. Turk and F. 




 Paras. 4 and 5. See also EXCOM Conclusion no.85 (XLIX) 1998. 
22
 Para.6. See also EXCOM no.85 (XLIX). 
23
 Para.7. See also EXCOM no.85 (XLIX). 
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a paramount principle, alongside family unity, is the principle of the best interests of the 
child given terms in the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child.24 EXCOM Conclusion 
no.88 (L) on the Protection of the Refugee’s Family (1999) offers a comprehensive view: 
‘the family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and it is entitled to 
protection by the society and the State’.25 Refugees have a right to family unity strongly 
anchored in international human rights law and international humanitarian law. The 
protection of this right implies the adoption of measures to reunify family members 
separated as a result of refugee flight, the application of liberal criteria in identifying 
family members who can be admitted for the purpose of reunification, and their 
recognition as refugees. The particular needs of unaccompanied children pending their 
reunification with their families should also be protected.26  
Finally, the UNHCR has also begun to acknowledge the importance of family unity 
and family reunification in promoting the smooth and rapid local integration of refugee 
families.27 In determining whether local integration (namely, socio-economic 
integration) may be an appropriate solution, it recommends that the links between a 
refugee and his/her country of asylum be considered, including family, social, cultural 
and economic links.28 
It follows that a subjective right to family life (or family) clearly exists under 
international human rights law. Even though a strong argument can be made in favour 
of a right to family reunification, based on the recognition of family life as a human 
                                                 
24
 EXCOM Conclusion no.47 (XXXVIII) 1987. See also EXCOM Conclusion no.84 (XLVIII) on Refugee Children 
and Adolescents (1997), and EXCOM Conclusion no.103 (LVI) 2005. 
25
 EXCOM Conclusion no.88 (L) on the Protection of the Refugee’s Family (1999). Note also: Principle 17(2) 
of the 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement gives effect to the right to family life for internally 
displaced persons by providing that ‘family members who wish to remain together shall be allowed to do 
so’. 
26
 See also EXCOM Conclusions No.105 (LVII) on Women and Girls at Risk (2006) and No.107 (LVIII) on 
Children at Risk (2007). 
27




right, the status of such a ‘right’ is less clear in international law. This lack of clarity is the 
result of a fragmented definition of ‘family’ underlying the concept of family 
reunification that ‘varies according to the value and importance attached to the 
principle of dependence’,29 on the one hand, and the principle of state’s sovereignty on 
the other hand. The various international legal instruments discussed above are 
evidence of myriad terminologies used in this context, namely, family, family life, family 
environment, family unity, family reunification etc., often without any definition. This is 
unfortunate for it creates uncertainty in this area, and allows states as key actors of 
protection to fail in their duties to take steps to reunite families. As shall be discussed 
below, in Europe at least, EU law now creates a positive obligation on the member 
states to authorise family reunification of certain members of the sponsor’s family, 
based on care in intimate relations and the promotion of migrants’ integration into the 
member states.30 A similar obligation is imposed by the European Court of Human 
Rights on the 47 contracting parties to the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR). 
 
3. Unpacking terminologies and states’ duty to respect family life under the ECHR 
 
3.1. Unpacking terminologies: the ‘family’, the society and cultural values or 
traditions 
Looking at ‘family’ first, some scholars consider that family or family life is synonymous 
with family unity; both are legal rights and family unity is simply ‘a subset or 
characteristic of having a family life’.31 Notwithstanding, ‘many commentators are 
careful to stress that ‘family unity’ is not to be confused with ‘family life’ nor with ‘family 
                                                 
29
 Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly’s Recommendation 1686 (2004), para.7. 
30
 Member states should when regulating family migration, take into account their own resources and 
accommodation and the migrants’ knowledge for the language of that country. See Commission Staff 
Working Paper, 24 May 2011 and Annual Report on Immigration and Asylum 2010. 
31
 Edwards, at p.311. 
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reunification’.’32 According to Jastram, ‘family unity’ in its broad meaning ‘covers issues 
related to admission, stay, and expulsion’, hence, only this broad understanding of 
‘family unity’ would encapsulate ‘family unity’ in a strict sense (namely, an ‘existing 
intact family’ which state’s action seeks to separate through the expulsion of one of its 
members) and ‘family reunification’ or reunion (namely, family members who are 
already separated by forced or voluntary migration and which state’s action seeks to 
prevent from regrouping in a country other than their country of origin).33 
More crucially, the question arises as to what kind of relationships constitutes 
‘family’ defined as the ‘natural and fundamental group unit of society’ in international 
human rights law? The UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) considers that the objectives 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) require that ‘the term 
“Family” [which appears in Article 17 ICCPR] …  be given a broad interpretation to 
include all those comprising the family as understood in the society of the State party 
concerned’.34 Thus, according to the HRC, ‘cultural traditions [or cultural values] should 
be taken into account when defining the term ‘family’ in a specific situation’ (emphasis 
added).35 In Hopu and Bessert v France, the claimants considered the relationship to 
their ancestors to be an essential element of their identity (namely history, culture and 
life) and to play an important role in their family life. The HRC therefore held the links 
between the claimants and their ancestors to constitute family life despite the lack of 
evidence of a direct kinship link, since the ‘burial grounds in question pre-date the 
arrival of European settlers and are recognized as including the forbears of the present 
Polynesian inhabitants of Tahiti’.36 However, four members of the Committee dissented 
because even if the term ‘family’ is to be interpreted differently in different societies, it 
does nonetheless have ‘a discrete meaning’. In particular, ‘[i]t does not include all 
members of one’s ethnic or cultural group. Nor does it necessarily include all one’s 
                                                 
32
 Stevens, ‘Asylum-Seeking Families’, at p.3. Referring to Jastram and Newland 2003. 
33
 Jastram, ‘Family Unity: The New Geography of Family Life’, p.1. 
34
 General Comments No.16 (1988), para.5. 
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ancestors, going back to time immemorial’.37 For these four members, the ‘cultural 
values’ referred to by the Committee are protected under Article 27 ICCPR but not 
Article 17 ICCPR which is concerned with family and privacy. This linkage between 
society and cultural values or tradition is an important element in the views of the HRC. 
UNHCR points to two different kinds of society: the first, to be found in many 
countries of origin, applies a ‘customarily broad definition of the family’; the second, to 
be found mainly in countries of asylum, defines a ‘narrower “nuclear family”.’38 The 
latter would include the relationship between a minor child and parent/s as well as the 
relationship between parents, or, if no children are involved, the relationship between 
spouses or unmarried co-habitees. The former would also include, for example, the 
relationship with siblings, uncles, aunts, cousins, and grandparents or dependent 
parents of each spouse. It is this absence of a cross-societal definition of ‘family’ in 
international law that makes the right to family life (including family unity and family 
reunification) illusory for migrants,39 and the right to respect for family life the subject of 
constant judicial intervention.  
In Europe, the European Court of Human Rights (also known as the Strasbourg 
Court) stands as a prime example in judicial intervention. Following the landmark case 
Marckx v Belgium,40 the Strasbourg Court has developed a robust understanding of 
‘family’ and ‘family life’ in the context of Article 8 ECHR. Article 8 protects ‘the right to 
respect for his private and family life, his home and correspondence’. The Strasbourg 
                                                 
37
 Dissenting opinion in Hopu and Bessert v France. 
38
 UNHCR Note on International Protection 2001, para.78. Note that the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (1989) protects the child’s ‘family’ (Article 16) generally understood to be the parents and their 
children, but also ‘where applicable, the members of the extended family or community as provided for 
by local custom, legal guardians or other persons legally responsible for the child (Article 5). If no parents 
of other family members can be found, the child should be provided with the same protection as any 
other child deprived of his/her ‘family environment’ (Article 22(2)). 
39
 Dallal Stevens uses the words ‘capable of assuming chimerical qualities’, in ‘Asylum-Seeking Families in 
Current Legal Discourse: A UK Perspective’, University of Warwick, Legal Studies Research Paper 2009/10, 
at p.3. Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1523092 
40
 Judgment of 13 June 1979. 
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Court considers the nature of the ‘ties’ between family members as crucial for the 
recognition of family life; it requires strong or close personal ties between individuals for 
family life to exist. Thus, it has recognised family life between married couple, married 
couple and their children (from the moment the child is born),41 unmarried couple living 
together with their children where the relationship is stable.42 Indeed, from the moment 
a child is born, they enter into a family relationship with their parents (irrespective of 
marital status).43 Cohabitation is not necessary for family life to be recognised in such a 
relationship; other factors may also serve to demonstrate that a relationship has 
‘sufficient constancy to create de facto family ties’, such as the nature and duration of 
the parents’ relationship as evidenced in particular by the following elements: whether 
they had planned to have a child, whether the father subsequently recognised the child 
as his, the contributions made to the child’s care and upbringing, and the quality and 
regularity of contact.44 Furthermore, the ties between a child and his/her parent may 
only be broken in ‘exceptional circumstances’.45 Family life without the existence of 
blood ties is also recognised.46 The requirement of ‘close personal ties’ also means that 
the Strasbourg Court recognises the existence of family life between members of the 
extended family, such as between children and their grandparents, since according to 
the Court, ‘such relatives may play a considerable part in family life’,47 siblings both as 
children48 and adults,49 or between nephew/niece and his/her uncle/aunt.50  
                                                 
41
 Berrehab v The Netherlands, judgment of 21 June 1988; Ciliz v The Netherlands, judgment of 11 July 
2000. 
42
 Johnston and others v Ireland, judgment of 18 December 1986. 
43
 Marckx v Belgium, judgment of 13 June 1979; A.W. Khan v United Kingdom, application no.47486/06, 
judgment of 12 January 2010, para.34. 
44
 Berrehab v The Netherlands, judgment of 21 June 1988; Boughanemi v France, judgment of 27 March 
1996; Chorfi v France, judgment of 7 August 1996; Ciliz v The Netherlands, judgment of 11 July 2000; A.W. 
Khan v United Kingdom, judgment of 12 January 2010, para.34. 
45
 Ahmut v Netherlands, 28 November 1996. 
46
 X, Y and Z v United Kingdom, 1997 (female-to-male transsexual and his child born by artificial 
insemination); also in cases of adoption or fostering (these relationship may also constitute ‘private life’). 
47
 Marckx v Belgium, judgment of 13 June 1979, para.45. 
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Other relationships may also be protected by the European Court of Human 
Rights under ‘private life’, such as the relationships between homosexuals and their 
partners with or without children, between adult siblings, and between parents and 
adult children. Of significance, the Strasbourg Court has recently held that ‘there will be 
no family life between parents and adult children unless they can demonstrate 
additional elements of dependence’,51 rather such relationship may be considered 
under private life. The Court explained 
[it] does not accept that the fact that the applicant was living with his mother 
and brothers, or the fact that the entire family suffered from different health 
complaints, constitutes a sufficient degree of dependence to result in the 
existence of family life.52 
The applicant in this case, Mr A.W. Khan, was not the sole carer for his mother and 
brothers, nor did the mother and brothers suffer from conditions that were ‘so severe 
as to entirely incapacitate them’,53 hence such relationship did not amount to family life 
but constituted private life. This judgment confirms previous case law concerning long-
term immigrants, most importantly Üner v The Netherlands, in which the Strasbourg 
Court held: 
Regardless of the existence or otherwise of a “family life” … the Court considers 
that the expulsion of a settled migrant constitutes interference with his or her 
right to respect for private life. It will depend on the circumstances of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
48
 Olsson v Sweden, judgment of 24 March 1988. 
49
 Boughanemi v France, judgment of 27 March 1996, a migration case, but see comments below. 
50
 Note that the CRC too protects the extended family (‘where applicable’) in an effort to accommodate 
cultural differences. See, Sonja Starr & Lea Brilmayer, ‘Family Separation as a Violation of International 
Law’, Berkeley Journal of International Law 21 (2003), pp.213-287, at p.221. 
51
 A.W. Khan v United Kingdom, judgment of 12 January 2010, at para.32. See also, Slivenko v Latvia, GC, 
application no.48321/99, para.97. 
52
 A.W. Khan v United Kingdom, 2010, para.32. 
53
 Ibid, para.32. 
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particular case whether it is appropriate for the Court to focus on the “family 
life” rather than the “private life” aspect.54 
The case law of the Strasbourg Court relating to ‘family life’ is therefore constantly 
evolving. From recognising ‘family life’ between a 34-year old and his parents and ten 
brothers and sisters living legally in France, even though he no longer lived with them,55 
the European Court of Human Rights is now clearly holding that such relationships 
would not qualified as ‘family life’ but could be found to constitute ‘private life’.56 This 
re-conceptualisation of certain relationships as private life rather than family life must 
be seen as positive for it reflects social realities, at least in western democracies, where 
families are no longer as central to people’s lives and where friends may be ‘the new 
family’.57 
 
3.2. The ‘enjoyment’ of family life 
The Strasbourg Court does not only look at ‘family’, namely the nature of the bond in 
the form of the closeness of the ties between the family members,58 it also looks at 
what family life actually is. In several judgments, the European Court of Human Rights 
has held: ‘The mutual enjoyment of each other’s company constitutes a fundamental 
element of family life’.59 According to Stevens, ‘it is this factor that distinguishes family 
                                                 
54
 Üner v The Netherlands, judgment of 18 October 2006, para.59. See also Slivenko et al. v Latvia, GC, 
judgment of 9 October 2003. 
55
 Boughanemi v France, para.35. 
56
 As in A.W. Khan v United Kingdom. 
57
 Iseult Honohan, ‘Reconsidering the Claim to Family Reunification in Migration’, Political Studies 57 
(2009), pp.768-787, at p.775. 
58
 What Stevens considers being the ‘unity’ of family, in Dallal Stevens, ‘Asylum-Seeking Families’, at p.4. 
59
 Mehemi v France (No.2), Application no. 53470/99, judgment 10 April 2003, para.45. Referring to Olsson 
v. Sweden (no. 1), judgment of 24 March 1988, para.59; Johansen v. Norway, judgment of 7 August 1996, 
para.52; Bronda v. Italy, judgment of 9 June 1998, para. 51. 
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life from family unity or the more mundane family ties’.60 In the case of Gül v 
Switzerland, Judge Martens in his dissenting opinion explained: 
According to the Court's well established case-law, “the mutual enjoyment by 
parent and child of each other's company constitutes a fundamental element of 
family life”. Consequently, decisions of State authorities hindering such 
enjoyment in principle amount to an infringement of the State's obligation to 
respect the family life of those concerned.61  
With such statement, the Strasbourg Court comes very close to recognising ‘what is 
sometimes called affiliation’ where the ‘value of family life may be seen as a matter of 
personal intimacy as much as physical support, of giving and receiving ‘care’ in the 
broadest sense’.62 In this regard, Honohan argues, ‘The right to family life may be 
thought of as a universal right to discharge special obligations, which recognizes the 
value of particular relations’.63 
 
3.3. States’ positive obligations to respect family life, including reuniting families, 
keeping them united, and granting residence permits 
In the Strasbourg Court's opinion, the right to respect for family life in Article 8(1) ECHR 
means, firstly, that ‘the State cannot interfere with the exercise of that right otherwise 
than in accordance with the strict conditions set out in paragraph 2’, and secondly that 
‘there may be positive obligations inherent in an effective "respect" for family life …This 
means, amongst other things … [the state] must act in a manner calculated to allow 
those concerned to lead a normal family life’.64 This positive obligation, which is 
inherent in Article 8, has been further developed in a number of cases to the extent that 
                                                 
60
 Dallal Stevens, ‘Asylum-Seeking Families’, at p.4. 
61
 Gül v Switzerland, judgment of 19 February 1996, Dissenting Opinion by judge Martens and approved 
by Judge Rosso, para.6. 
62
 Iseult Honohan, ‘Reconsidering the Claim to Family Reunification in Migration’, Political Studies 57 
(2009), pp.768-787, at p.771. 
63
 Ibid, at p.772. 
64
 Marckx, para.31. 
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the scope of the positive obligations entailed by Article 8 will depend on a ‘fair balance’ 
between community and individual interests, namely, a proportionality test. Family 
reunification remains disputed as a human right precisely because it requires states to 
take positive steps. 
The case law of the Strasbourg Court under Article 8 provides ‘the most 
elaborated concept of proportionality’.65 However, it is in the application of the 
proportionality test that limitations on the family reunification of migrants are being 
imposed because the Court recognizes states a wide margin of appreciation in this area. 
Actually, the Strasbourg Court is more willing to protect family rights in relations to 
removal than in relation to refusal of entry.66 The Court has indeed introduced a 
distinction between cases of removal of an alien from the territory of a contracting 
party, resulting in the break up of family unity, and cases of (refusal of) entry of aliens 
into the territory of a contracting party for the purpose of family reunification. In the 
case of the former (removal), the Court has been willing to tip the balance in favour of 
integrated aliens, including refugees and other beneficiaries of protection, provided 
they can show strong family (or private) ties with members in the country where the 
family lives67 and they have not committed a serious criminal offence   (e.g., drug 
trafficking, rape, murder). The legal or illegal status of the parent (e.g., s/he entered 
illegally or overstayed) does not seem to be important for the Court because ‘by 
attaching such paramount importance to this latter element [residing illegally in the 
Netherlands at the time of the child’s birth], the authorities may be considered to have 
indulged in excessive formalism’.68 However, in the case of the latter (refusal of entry), 
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the Court will usually balance the individual’s rights against the community’s interest at 
the early stage of establishing whether it is reasonable to expect aliens to develop 
family life elsewhere. This approach has been criticized for ‘its effect was to collapse the 
distinction between the interference with an individual’s right and a State’s violation of 
a Convention Article’.69 As a result, only few cases of entry for the purpose of family 
reunification have succeeded.70 
The argument has been made that unless family unity is removed from 
considerations of state’s immigration and border control and becomes recognized as a 
fundamental (in other words absolute) human right, on par with the prohibition against 
torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, its implementation in domestic law and 
practice will always remain imperfect.71 More pragmatically, the European Court of 
Human Rights has showed willingness to move beyond the right to ‘family life’, and to 
give content instead to the right to ‘private life’ of migrants (this is consistent with the 
Court’s judgments in Üner and A.W. Khan). In Aristimuño Mendizabal v France 2006, it 
found state’s refusal to grant (or excessive delay in granting) a residence permit to an 
immigrant (whether legal or illegal) who had been residing in the country for many 
years, to constitute unlawful interference with a migrant’s right to private life under 
Article 8 ECHR, independently from issues of deportation, where such refusal or delay 
cannot be objectively justified. It follows, that the conditions for granting a residence 
permit fall within the scope of protection of Article 8 ECHR and as such they warrant 
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protection as an autonomous human rights.72 Two weeks later, in Rodrigues Da Silva & 
Hoogkamer v The Netherlands, the Court, having acknowledged the importance of the 
best interests of a child as enshrined in Articles 3 and 40 of the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC), allowed a mother from Brazil to stay in the Netherlands with 
her daughter (a Dutch national from birth and whose father was Dutch). In effect, the 
Court was granting her a residence permit for the Netherlands, despite the Dutch 
authorities never having authorised her to remain in the country.73 The Strasbourg Court 
has also emphasized the obligation to take the best interests of the child into account, 
including the obligation to facilitate her reintegration after having committed an 
offence, when considering expulsion measures against a juvenile offender.74 
Thus, the Strasbourg Court’s approach to migrants under Article 8 ECHR is no 
longer limited to balancing ‘the preservation of family unity and the maintenance of 
public order, but extends to the factual implications of a foreigner’s legal status’.75 In 
this new approach, the Court is much more aware of the importance of the best 
interests and well-being of children caught up in a situation which is their parents’ 
making and not their own; for the Court the best interest of the child enshrined in 
Articles 3 and 40 CRC encompasses an obligation to facilitate the child’s reintegration 
through the national juvenile justice system. This lack of formalism on the part of the 
European Court of Human Rights illustrates its long-standing position on the effective 
protection of human rights and its important role in promoting the ECHR as a 
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‘constitutional instrument of European public order’.76 Recent case law from the Court 
of Justice of the EU in Luxembourg shows similar reasoning in the context of EU 
citizenship.  
 
4. The European Union and its court 
 
4.1. The legislative framework and a right to family reunification in EU law 
In the early days of the then European Economic Community (EEC), an effective and 
enforceable right to family reunification for nationals of the member states was 
essential in ensuring freedom of movement of workers within the EEC; this right was 
granted through Regulation 1612/68.77 Since freedom of movement for workers did not 
cover third-country nationals and non-EEC immigration matters lay outside the scope of 
the Community institutions, family reunification rights of non-EEC migrants and refugees 
remained at the discretion of each individual member state (subject of course to the 
control of the European Court of Human Rights). However, plans to create of an area of 
freedom, security and justice, and the recognition of the right to move freely 
throughout the EU for all,78 led to significant changes.  The right to family life is now set 
forth in Article 7 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights as a fundamental right 
protected by law.79 This provision ‘must be fully applied by all EU institutions, 
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agencies and by the Member States and their agencies when implementing EU law’.80 
However, a recent study highlights the limited application of Charter rights to individuals 
due to not enough attention being paid to access of justice, the enforcement of Charter 
rights and possible remedies for individuals whose fundamental rights have been 
breached.81 The last ten years also saw the adoption of common minimum standards 
relating to ‘family’ and ‘family reunification’ being adopted in the context of migration. 
Of particular relevance is Council Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family 
reunification.82 
This Directive establishes family reunification as an independent right for citizens 
and their non-citizen nuclear family members.83 It emphasizes that family reunification 
is ‘a necessary way of making family life possible’84 and that ‘[m]easures concerning 
family reunification should be adopted in conformity with the obligation to protect the 
family and respect family life’.85 In other words, the right to family life becomes 
meaningless in the absence of a member state’s recognition of the right to family 
reunification, especially in cases where family reunification is necessary to establish a 
family life. It further sees family reunification as a contributor to economic and social 
cohesion by facilitating the integration of third country nationals in the member state. 
The Directive therefore has a dual purpose: one, to regulate the exercise of the right to 
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family reunification for non-EU nationals, and two, to develop an integration policy that 
will grant non-EU nationals rights and obligations similar to those of EU citizens.  
The Directive nevertheless provides limits to family reunification on grounds of 
public policy, public security or public health, or in situations where the sponsor lacks 
accommodation, sickness insurance or minimum length of residency.86 In all such cases 
(i.e., rejection, withdrawal or refusal of renewal), the Directive requires the member 
states to carry out a proportionality test similar to that applied by the European Court of 
Human Rights in the context of Article 8 ECHR, namely to balance ‘the nature and 
solidity of the person’s family relationships and the duration of his residence in the 
Member State’ against ‘the existence of family, cultural and social ties with his/her 
country of origin’.87 
The Directive applies to all Union citizens who move or reside in a member state 
other than that of which they are a national, and to their family members who 
accompany or join them.88 However, the Directive adopts a restrictive definition of 
‘family members, which is limited to the nuclear family, for the purpose of authorising 
entry and residence into a member state of the EU. The member states shall authorise 
the entry and residence of the spouse and unmarried minor children (of the ‘sponsor’) 
who are dependent and who do not enjoy proper family support in the country of 
origin.89 In addition, member states may request that minor children be below 15 years 
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of age.90 Member states may also choose to authorise the entry and residence of first-
degree relatives (of the ‘sponsor' or spouse) in the direct ascending line who are 
dependent on them and do not enjoy family support in the country of origin, as well as 
adult unmarried children who are ‘objectively unable to provide for their own needs on 
account of their state of health’.91 Finally, member states may choose to authorise the 
entry and residence of unmarried partners, registered partners, and their unmarried 
minor children under a number of restrictive conditions.92 
In sum, Council Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification 
establishes a right to family reunification in EU law, albeit one that is limited to 
members of the nuclear family, namely, the spouse of the ‘sponsor’ and minor children 
solely dependent on the ‘sponsor’. Other family members remain at the discretion of 
national immigration law or regulation and general norms of international law on family 
life.   
There is also a certain amount of flexibility in the Directive particularly 
concerning evidence of an existing relationship for refugees where documentary 
evidence may be lacking. In such cases, any other evidence of that relationship may be 
taken into account.93 Further specific provisions apply to refugees and their right to 
family reunification. In particular, unaccompanied minors who are refugees shall be 
authorised to be reunited with his/her parent without conditions of dependency being 
required.94 In cases where there are no parents or these cannot be traced, 
unaccompanied refugee children may only be allowed to be joined by their legal 
guardian or other relatives of the family.95 The scope of this Directive does not however 
cover beneficiaries of subsidiary protection. 
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Further EU requirements are provided in Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 
2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents. 
Article 12, in particular, offers protection against expulsion to long-term residents who 
do not constitute ‘an actual and sufficiently serious threat to public policy or public 
security’. Economic considerations cannot be a ground for the expulsion of long-term 
residents. Decisions to expel must have regard to the duration of residence in the 
country of residence, the age of the person concerned, the consequences for the person 
concerned and family members, and the links with the country of residence or the 
absence of links with the country of origin. On 11 May 2011, the European Parliament 
and the Council adopted Directive 2011/51/EU which extends the scope of Council 
Directive 2003/109/EC to beneficiaries of international protection, namely, refugees and 
beneficiaries of subsidiary protection.96 
Directive 2004/38/EC of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and 
their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the member 
states is also relevant. This Directive provides that freedom of movement and residence 
of Union citizens and their family members (irrespective of nationality) may be 
restricted on grounds of public policy, public security or public health, but not for 
economic reasons.97 Any such restrictions must conform to the principle of 
proportionality and must be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual 
concerned which itself ‘must represent a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat 
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affecting one of the fundamental interests of society’.98 Any decision on expulsion of an 
EU citizen or their family members (irrespective of nationality) must take account of the 
length of residence of the individual concerned in the country in question, his/her age 
and state of health, family and economic situation, social and cultural in the country in 
question and the links (if any) with the country of origin.99 Consistent with Directive 
2003/109/EC, EU member states may not expel a long-term resident who is a EU citizen, 
or their family members irrespective of nationality, except on serious grounds of public 
policy or public security.100 The Directive further restricts member states from expelling, 
except on imperative grounds of public security, a EU citizen who has resided in the host 
member states for the previous 10 years, or minors (unless by application of the best 
interests of the child’s principle).101 
 Finally, limited rights for family members of refugees are provided in the 
Qualification Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004.102 The Directive recognizes the 
importance of family unity (Article 23(1)) but again it defines the ‘family’ in restrictive 
terms. First, the family must have already existed in the country of origin and its 
members must be present in the same member state as the person seeking protection 
and at the time that person seeks refugee status. Extension of protection to other family 
members is left entirely at the discretion of the member states. Furthermore, only 
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family members of refugees - and not beneficiaries of subsidiary protection103 - are 
entitled to a residence permit.104 Article 23(2) in particular provides that ‘In so far as the 
family members of beneficiaries of subsidiary protection status are concerned, Member 
States may define the conditions applicable to such benefits’ (e.g., a residence permit 
valid for one year, renewable, instead of three years, renewable, for refugees).105 Most 
of the EU member states applying the Qualification Directive do not however take 
advantage of this discretion. France, the Czech Republic, Ireland, Italy, and the 
Netherlands, for instance, provide the same rules on family reunification for refugees 
and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection; but family reunification is not guaranteed for 
beneficiaries of the subsidiary protection in Germany, and in Poland only after 7 years of 
uninterrupted residency.106 In addition, EU member states have adopted grounds based 
on international obligations relating to family unity (complementary protection), in 
particular Article 8 ECHR. A 2009 ECRE study highlights five countries that adopted 
complementary protection related to family matters: Austria, the UK, Denmark, Ireland 
and Belgium.107 In some countries, these persons are granted even less rights than those 
recognized to beneficiaries of subsidiary protection. For instance, in Austria, while 
beneficiaries of subsidiary protection have the right to family reunification at least in 
relation to family members outside Austria and seeking entry into Austria, the 
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complementary protection status does not allow any kind of family reunification.108 In 
fact, the right to family reunification for persons recognized complementary protection 
is seriously limited in all but one country, Sweden.109 
In sum, EU legislation explicitly recognises a right to family reunification but the 
practical application of this right is considerably limited by a narrow definition of ‘family 
members’, i.e., the nuclear family of a sponsor or a refugee (excluding beneficiaries of 
subsidiary protection). 
 
4.2. The ECJ/CJEU and its relationship with the European Court of Human Right: 
synergy or fragmentation? 
In Parliament v Council (2006), the first case to have been decided in Luxembourg 
following the adoption of EU legislation on asylum and immigration, the European 
Parliament brought an action for annulment against certain provisions of the family 
reunification Directive 2003/86/EC. In this case, the ECJ clearly stated its readiness to 
follow the Strasbourg case law on Art 8 ECHR as the main source of EU human rights 
standards.110 The case law of the Strasbourg Court on Article 8 ECHR therefore 
constitutes the benchmark for the Luxembourg Court when interpreting provisions of 
EU law relating to family life and family reunification. But the EC Directive goes further 
than Article 8 ECHR in two respects:  it sets forth procedures for how states should treat 
applications for family reunification, and it specifies the rights of family members living 
within the member state once the application is accepted.111 As such, it is possible 
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(perhaps even likely) that the European Court of Human Rights will be influenced by the 
EC Directive when interpreting Article 8 ECHR in the context of family reunification and 
migrants. In the case M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, the Grand Chamber of the Strasbourg 
Court re-interpreted Articles 3 and 5 ECHR in the light of Belgium and Greece’s 
obligations under EU law, in particular the Dublin II Regulation and the Reception 
Directive, because the standards under EU law were found to be higher than under 
ECHR law.112 Equally, the family reunification Directive and long-term residents Directive 
may serve as human rights standards to give added content to ‘family life’ and ‘private 
life’ under Article 8 ECHR in the member states of the EU. However, as things stand, the 
approach of the European Court of Human Rights to ‘family life’ (i.e., family members) 
and ‘private life’ is less restrictive than that of the Court of Justice of the EU, hence it is 
predicted that the Strasbourg Court case law will continue to remain the benchmark for 
the Luxembourg Court for many years to come. 
In the recent case Zambrano v Office National de l’Emploi,113 two Colombian 
nationals, Gerard Ruiz Zambrano and his wife, were claiming a right to reside in Belgium 
on account of the Belgian nationality of their two younger children.  Their son Diego and 
daughter Jessica were born in Belgium in 2003 at a time when their parents resided 
there after being granted a form of humanitarian protection.  Both children acquired 
Belgian nationality because they would otherwise have been stateless. Their 
father obtained employment, but he and his wife subsequently lost their protective 
status in Belgium, and Mr Zambrano was prevented from working.  His claim for 
unemployment benefits was rejected, and his appeal against that decision led to this 
referral to the CJEU. 
The Court reaffirmed its earlier decision in Zhu & Chen v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department114 and the ‘effet utile’ of the residence right of the child, but 
went further in asserting the rights of children who are EU nationals by birth. Rejecting 
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the argument that in order to benefit from the provisions of the EU Treaty, the 
Zambrano family had to have cross a EU border, the CJEU relied on Article 20 TFEU 
recognizing the right of EU citizens to move and reside freely within the territory of 
member states as a constituent element of European citizenship. The Court concluded 
that the refusal to grant a right of residence to Mr and Mrs Zambrano, and the refusal to 
allow Mr Zambrano to work, deprived their EU children from the genuine enjoyment of 
the substance of their rights (as EU citizens) for themselves and their parents.  
In sum, this judgment suggests a requirement on states to regularize the stay of 
non-EU nationals residing in a EU member state who have a EU citizen child (which 
under EU law is anyone under the age of 21), through a right of residence and work 
permits.115  However, unlike in the recent jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court, the 
Luxembourg only referred in passim to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.116 
This judgment nonetheless removes one of the weaknesses of the Chen judgment, 
namely, the fact that non-EU parents were required to be self-sufficient and 
therefore were prevented from working in the member state where they lived.117 
Two months later, in McCarthy v Secretary of State for the Home Department,118 
the CJEU was faced with whether to apply the Zambrano’s logic to a case involving a 
third country national spouse but no children. Shirley McCarthy, a dual UK and Irish 
national who was born in the UK and had always been resident there, had sought to rely 
on her Irish nationality and EU law to obtain a residence card for herself and her 
Jamaican husband. The CJEU found that she could not benefit from such EU right since 
she had never exercised her right to freedom of movement and had always resided in a 
member state of which she was a national. In reaching its decision, the CJEU considered 
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two provisions of the TFEU, Article 20 and Article 21, both of which guarantee every 
citizen of the Union the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
member states. The Court found Article 21 not to be applicable to a Union citizen who, 
first, had never exercised her right of free movement, second, had always resided in a 
member state of which she was a national and, third, was also a national of another 
member state, unless the measure in question would have the effect of depriving her of 
the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of her status as 
a Union citizen. The Court also referred to Article 20 TFEU and the decision of the Grand 
Chamber in Zambrano, and found that no element of Mrs McCarthy's situation indicated 
that the national measure taken against her had the effect of depriving her of the 
genuine enjoyment of the substance of her EU rights.  Essentially, she was an adult, and 
denial of access to her EU rights did not have the same effect as a similar measure did 
on the Zambrano children. The national decision did not "oblige her to leave the 
territory of the EU", as a negative decision would have done in Zambrano. 
In sum, this judgment provides an illustration of the Zambrano’s decision in the 
case of an adult seeking to assert free movement rights to help her third country 
national husband. Since the national decision in this case would not have forced her to 
leave the territory of the EU, the CJEU found the denial of the right to move and reside 
freely within the territory of the member states not to have the effect of depriving her 
of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of her 
status as a Union citizen. This interpretation is reminiscent of the interpretation of the 
European Court of Human Rights in its recent case law (see discussion above on 
Aristimuno Mendizabal, Rodriges Da Silva, and Malsov), but there are at least two 
important differences; first, the Strasbourg Court does not require a child to be 
involved, second, when a child is involved, the Strasbourg Court acknowledges in much 





This chapter has discussed the existence of a right to family (or family life) and states’ 
duty to facilitate the reunification of families in international law. In Europe, both 
regional courts (the Strasbourg Court and the Luxembourg Court) have taken the view 
that depriving people of their right to family reunification is equal to interference with 
family life. Of particular interest is the fact that both courts have been focusing on the 
enjoyment of the right to family reunification rather than the existence of the right 
itself. Hence, in a number of recent cases, the two courts have sought to give content to 
a state’s duty to respect family reunification through a right of residence and work 
permits; family life ‘must not only be ‘respected’, it must also be ‘protected’’ within the 
meaning of ‘a positive protective function’.119 However, in practice, their approach differ 
quite considerably as the Luxembourg Court finds itself constrained to operate within a 
stricter (more narrow) legislative framework (based on considerations of free 
movement and European citizenship) than the Strasbourg Court, hence, the 
Luxembourg Court’s approach to granting a right of residence to foreign nationals may 
be said to be more restrictive than that of the Strasbourg Court.  Notwithstanding, this 
chapter shows that the two courts are working in synergy (at least for now) in the 
protection of the right to family reunification of migrants living in Europe in that both 
courts are essentially concerned with issues of integration in society and care in intimate 
relations. 
Like in Europe, in the Americas and in Africa, the right to family reunification has 
been affirmed and given substance following judicial intervention. The Inter-American 
system, like the European system, protects the right to family life120 and imposes upon 
states both positive and negative obligations to ensure that these rights are enforced, 
including a positive obligation to actively facilitate the reunification of families,121 the 
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tracing of relatives, and the full investigation of disappeared family members.122 The 
African legal system also recognizes the family as the fundamental unit of society, and 
requires states to protect the unity of the family.123 In a case against Lybia,124 the HRC 
interpreted the state’s duty to facilitate family reunification (Articles 17 and 23 ICCPR) as 
including the right to leave one’s own country in order to reunite (Article 12 ICCPR). 
Such a right, the HRC held, is given effect by the right not to have one’s own passport 
confiscated. It follows that, as far as this case can tell, there is consistency between the 
views of the HRC and the case law of the European courts in their determination to give 
content to states’ duty to respect or facilitate family reunification in order to improve 
the implementation of this obligation. 
This chapter also identified key areas of controversy that require further 
development. Particularly noteworthy is the lack of a cross-societal definition of family 
and the resulting consequence of a lack of clear commitment to guaranteeing family 
reunification. Also worth noting is the fact that family life by its very nature concerns a 
particular group of individuals; the family or family life must be respected as a single 
entity for it to be meaningful. So, perhaps there is good reason for viewing family unity 
and family reunification as a group right rather than as an individual right. This is a view 
which the HRC took in Hopu v France but also the UK House of Lords (now the Supreme 
Court) when it recognized all members of a family to be ‘victims’ in Article 8 ECHR.125 
Finally, as discussed herein, the European Court of Human Rights recently chose to 
reconceptualise certain relationships as private life rather than family life. This also 
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raises a number of questions. What do these choices tell us about the value of and right 
to family life? What are our reasons for respecting family life? And, crucially, will/should 
the Court of Justice of the EU follow the same path? 
